In October 2006, the President of the United States signed into law the SAFE Port Act. This act for the first time defined the global supply chain to include origin to destination, and it defined a smart container as one that uses a device or system to detect a penetration or entry of the container during its movement. It also provided a financial return to those who qualify at certain levels of security by allowing expedited treatment through the Customs process. Tier 3, the highest level, cites the requirement for the use of container security devices and technology.

As evidenced by the SAFE Port Act and by movements in Europe such as Phase II of the EU–US smart container project, which began on November 13, 2006, it is widely acknowledged that security and control in the logistics supply chain are paramount to the efficiency of operations in international commerce and to the security of the United States.¹ Smart containers are necessary to provide information automatically on the movement of cargo from origin to destination as well as to detect, record, and transmit surreptitious breaches of a sealed container throughout its global movement through a U.S. port of entry and on to its destination in the United States. So far, it appears that most container security investment went into radio-frequency identification (RFID) applications. However, RFID applications to global container security are costly, less effective than alternatives, and doomed to marginal performance or failure. RFID applications, whether active or passive,² have very clear weaknesses and impediments to usage in a worldwide context. The impediments are these: the absence of agreement on RFID worldwide standards; its land-based character; the rights to acquisition, cost, and control of required RFID infrastructure; and its historical nature of providing information always after the fact. Finally, because of its nature and the control of frequencies by governments, an RFID signal can be the actual means of detonating an explosive device in a container as it is queried at a U.S. port upon arrival by a benign transceiver, appropriately and legally used.³

Radio-Frequency Identification

RFID technology in logistics is not new. Wal-Mart and Target are well-known proponents of its use. Everyone has been exposed to it when leaving a department store but may not have known it unless the alarm at the door sounded. Its application to international transportation across the U.S. land borders with Canada and Mexico was tested by the government in the mid-1990s with the approval of its use by the U.S. Department of Transportation and U.S. Customs—now Customs and Border Protection (CPB), which is part of the Homeland Security Department. The test was called the North American Trade Prototype and took place at six U.S. land ports. Speaking as a participant in the test along the southern border, I can state unequivocally that the test failed, because of both institutional and RFID-technology reasons.

The principle of RFID is quite simple. RFID applications require the carriage and transmission of data through a wireless system. Data can be loaded into a device called a transponder and can then be transmitted via radio waves when the transponder is triggered by a corresponding device called a transceiver or reader. The transponder is a slave RFID unit that reacts to a triggering radio-frequency message from the master transceiver. The transceiver, through its antenna, sends the triggering frequency, which produces a return transmission of the data preloaded into the transponder—for example, manifest or shipping data or information acquired by the RFID device, such as the opening of the container door. Since the transmission of these data is by electromagnetic waves, the successful transmission is subject to the use of the proper frequencies or waves and the absence of distortion such as noise or same-frequency emissions from competing antennas, the direction (footprint) of which unintentionally or intentionally obstructs or interferes with the intended RFID transmissions of the intended transponder.

For the transponder and reader to talk to each other, they need to speak in the same way. In other words, they must follow a protocol or a set of instructions. While no analogy is perfect, assume it is something like one person speaking Spanish and the other English and at different speeds, with different volumes, and both talking at the same time. In our analogy, protocols tell each person (or the container and the reader) when to start and stop, what language to use, how fast to talk, etc. Unless the instructions are clear to each, communication may not take place.⁴ There are no global protocols or standards, however.

Imagine the lack of standardized instructions for a container and its transponder on a global voyage: different regions will have different standards. There are national standards such as those of the American National Standards Institute, international standards such as those of the International Organization for Standardization, and industrial standards such as those of EPCglobal, Inc., which alone is in about 100 countries. The International Organization for Standardization has 12 standards related to RFID.

Until there is some universal or global protocol or set of instructions, RFID use in shipping container security is unlikely. A major problem involves frequency approval by different governments. Like protocols, RFID-approved frequencies differ globally. Thus, RFID on which the data ride in the United States will not work in another part of the world. The foreign transceiver cannot trigger the data transmission, because the United States may use a different frequency. For example, the U.S. Federal Communications Commission issued a final rule effective June 23, 2004, that only 433 MHz RFID systems may be used for commercial shipping containers. Likewise, other countries in other RFID frequency regions have approved different frequencies for different uses. Therefore, RFID for container security is applicable only to those areas of the world that have agreed on the same frequency. Besides the frequency problem exemplified by a lack of worldwide standardization, an equally troublesome area for RFID usage in container security is the overland movement of containers and the corresponding creation of a land-based infrastructure of antennas and readers. Unlike RFID tags used in products and pallets, which are read in controlled distribution systems, active RFID devices in containers that move around the world through uncontrolled environments require the construction of antennas at chokepoints (those points along the container’s journey that cannot be circumvented by the carrier. Constructing a controlled distribution path globally is really impossible. The A. T. Kearney report defines chokepoint location this way: “Chokepoints where readers might be positioned include the spot where a truck is loaded or unloaded, on a crane that transfers containers, a weigh station, the port of loading, or at the port of discharge.”⁵ Only for these obvious chokepoints at origin and destination is a land-based system a reasonable option. In areas along the route of the container’s movement, a land-based system is often complex.

RFID generally requires line-of-sight transmissions. In the case of container security, each RFID transponder connected to a container would have to “see” the transceiver that triggers the transmission of data from the container. The approved 433 MHz frequency requires line of sight. How close the reader is to the container is also a troublesome issue. Geography and topography are consequently a potential issue in constructing antenna systems close enough to the container but far enough away to see the antenna of the transponder connected to the container.

Associated with the access and cost of RFID infrastructure is the cost of container modification. An inexpensive passive RFID tag can be hung on the outside of the doors and respond to a transceiver with a reply as to whether the doors have been opened in the normal manner. A more expensive active RFID device can also be hung on the outside of the doors and send a signal on its own at a chokepoint indicating whether the doors have been opened (assuming the doors can be read at the chokepoint). However, an active RFID device placed inside the container that can sense access to the container through means other than the doors is an expensive proposition compared to the inexpensive passive tag. Not only does the active device itself cost more, but also the container has to be structurally modified to accommodate the internal RFID transponder and its antenna. Since the RFID frequency approved for containers does not emit through steel, to function, the RFID device internal to the container must have access through the steel to the outside—a required modification to the container. Given its limited value, permanently modifying a container for only RFID may be unacceptable to the owners.

RFID alone is certainly not the silver bullet or even an ideal method, nor necessarily the least expensive method of container security. So far, the literature on this subject has focused not on a solution to the problem of security, but on a communication device that is one part of the solution. The security solution requires a complete system of end-to-end coverage, a solution from origin to destination, one without the disparate protocols and frequencies or the problems of access to and cost of land-based infrastructure.

The future of container security is a satellite solution, which by its nature avoids RFID’s frequency and protocol limitations, land-based character involving infrastructure costs, historical reporting nature, and the danger when the container holds an explosive device designed to be detonated by a firm’s own transceiver in a U.S. port. The global movement of containers requires a global solution, unencumbered by the constraints inherent in current RFID applications and lack of standards. The apparent rush to RFID applications for container security in a global market is premature and limited as a land-based system.

Satellite Technology

In general, there are two broad categories of satellite systems. The first and most widely known is geostationary or high-orbit satellites in equatorial orbit that appear to be stationary. Geostationary or geosynchronous satellites are approximately 36,000 kilometers or 23,320 miles above the Earth and rotate along with the Earth. The second category is a low-Earth-orbit (LEO) satellites approximately 800 kilometers or 496 miles above the Earth; these do not rotate with the Earth. The advantages for LEO applications include inexpensive narrow-band data transmission in frequencies similar to FM signals. Some LEO systems allow for voice and visual signals. Regardless, both LEO and geosynchronous systems offer logistics advantages by tracking and identifying the location of containers and trailers throughout the supply chain. Additionally, a firm such as Orbcomm (a LEO constellation owner) provides 24-hour communication service at multiple gateway control centers that receive, manage, and forward communications from their satellites to locations worldwide. Yet it seems that, perhaps, not LEO but geostationary satellite communication systems such as Iridium’s may have advantages over LEO systems because of better real-time reporting and smaller antennas.

RFID Combined With Satellite Communications

A device combining RFID and satellite technology is a workable application for both logistics and security problems involved in global commerce. However, satellite-only systems seem to serve as the best alternative as long as they are fused with sensing capacity. There is significant use of satellites in a geosynchronous orbit for monitoring the location of containers and trailers, mostly for asset management purposes. It is important to remember, though, the distinction between satellite tracking and satellite communications. Tracking may be perfectly fine for asset management but inadequate for container security and control. Tracking means that the GPS antenna only receives from the satellite. Satellite communications require a modem and an additional antenna along with other electronic circuitry that will allow the container to talk to the satellite under certain conditions. GPS systems are not without weaknesses—for instance, dead spots and visible antennas on the conveyance. Having a visible antenna, while seemingly harmless, allows those who intend to hijack or breach a container or trailer for the purpose of terrorism to do so without detection. Second, the capacity to sense what is going on inside the container and its reporting require greater electronic sophistication than tracking only. Third, the interoperability of two distinct technologies such as RFID and satellite poses additional problems that can be overcome but with higher costs.

Nonetheless, either a combination of RFID and satellite communication capacity or satellite-only technology with sensing, reporting, and data-storing capacity integrally linked to a human agent provides both security and logistics value in a global supply chain and by its nature becomes the smart container. Either option that can detect and report container breaching in real time or almost real time, from stuffing to lading in the vessel at a foreign port and from discharge to destination in the United States, virtually extends the U.S. borders to foreign locations. It also should provide Tier 3 green lane benefits to the user. Additionally, if the smart container is equipped with in-container radiation sensing and other specialized sensing, it may avoid the time and concomitant costs of long lines of containers waiting to pass through portal radiation systems now at foreign ports of departure and U.S. ports of entry.

There is also the added benefit of better radiation detection since, given the state of technology of portal radiation detection machines, which do not detect shielded enriched uranium, any in-container system would be preferable since science demonstrates that in-container systems that are closer to the source of radiation for longer periods could detect its presence and preclude the need to stand in line waiting for enriched uranium detection, which is impossible to do at this time through portal X-ray machines.⁶

The Human Element

As a former counter-intelligence professional, I find it clear that no system is 100% effective and that we cannot depend on technology alone. However, technology often overshadows the role of humans in security systems. For instance, a smart container system employing only RFID and satellite technologies is incomplete. It lacks the identification of a party responsible for final inspection of the cargo prior to its dispatch and subsequent international movement. Someone must necessarily take responsibility for confirming the cargo on the bill of lading or booking sheet and activating the container. A smart container system must have a person or persons at origin to attest to the contents of the container and to the accuracy of the bill of lading or booking sheet, to activate the technology, and to lock the doors. This responsible party must be vetted with respect to integrity and competence. Equally, there must be a counterpart at the destination. Both parties must be electronically associated by a unique identifier to the smart container to complete the system. This can be done with an RFID activation key that is loaded at origin with bill of lading and booking information, or information needed by Customs authorities, and other data such as the identity of the final agent activating the system. This secure electronic key is used to transport and insert selected data from the company’s logistics system into the device affixed in the container. Therefore, at activation the responsible party becomes an integral element in the smart container security system. Once the container is activated by inserting the electronic key, data contained in the RFID component of the device can be read at almost any time during the voyage. The activation also allows the smart container to notify appropriate parties of an unauthorized breach or to report the condition of the container or, depending on the sensors used, to report the condition of the cargo within the container and even to report its own hijacking.

Potential Benefit to U.S. Security

Besides government use, there are four classes of likely business users of RFID or RFID-satellite devices and satellite-only systems. The first is the U.S. shipper who produces abroad and ships sealed containers to the United States, especially if shipping to himself as consignee, or any shipper of high-value cargo, or both. The second is the steamship line that offers smart containers to certain container-load customers and that uses these devices for its own less-than-container load (LCL) operations in making (stuffing) full containers at ports of export. The third is the maritime freight forwarder and/or non-vessel-operating common carrier who would use this device on all LCLs it builds for multiple foreign shippers or for its customers who ship full containers. Fourth is the container manufacturer who could easily produce smart containers with little additional cost.

If a smart container is employed by these potential users, DHS authorities, especially CBP, would see the following benefits. First, with 22.5 million containers, trailers, and railcars (depending on your source of information) entering the United States annually, these conveyances would have an additional layer of security not afforded by electronic seals and locks, since door locks are easily bypassed at almost any point within the supply chain without the knowledge of the shipper, carrier, forwarder, or CBP. Second, an unauthorized breach would be recorded at the time it is perpetrated and then transmitted to DHS authorities in real time if a smart container is used, since RFID-only devices transmit data only at predetermined fixed locations where RFID transceiver-interrogators are installed. Both RFID-only and smart containers can inform CBP that a compromised container should be inspected. The difference is that the smart container can do it in real time. Third, a report generated by the reader or RFID interrogator in the U.S. seaport or land port of entry indicating that a container had not been breached since loading and sealing would make the container a candidate for swift, preferential treatment by CBP, consistent with the intent of the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, the Container Security Initiative, Free and Secure Trade, and the Pre-Arrival Processing System (all CBP programs). Fourth, any container or trailer not fitted with an intrusion-detection device could be automatically flagged as a potential problem. These four benefits would limit the field of potential CBP inspections, pinpoint compromised containers for inspection, provide an objective basis for preferential treatment, and encourage non-users to adopt a container security device. Their value is equally obvious for the user, with one additional benefit: If a smart container system is equipped with geo-fencing communications capabilities, the container can report its own hijacking.

Overall, the use of RFID-satellite systems or satellite-only systems makes the inspection of containers and trailers arriving in U.S. ports more efficient and less expensive while being more comprehensive. With the cooperation of CBP, these devices would also be able to communicate with the International Trade Data System that may serve as a gateway to the CBP Automated Commercial Environment.

A typical control room

References

Click on an end note number to return to the article.

1. “Trial of a Revolutionary Container Security System With Satellite Monitoring,” Powers Intl. press release, Nov. 13, 2006.

2. Passive RFID devices respond only when activated by an outside signal emitted from a transceiver. A passive device has no independent power supply. An active RFID device has its own power and can emit a signal on its own without having to be triggered by a transceiver.

3. James Giermanski, “DHS Caught in Its Own Trap,” American Shipper, March 2006, pp. 4-6.

4. For a more complete explanation of protocols, see “The Interference Issue in RFID Protocols—Reader-Talks-First Versus Tag-Talks-First,” Transponder News.

5. A. T. Kearney, “Smart Boxes: RFID Can Improve Efficiency, Visibility and Security in the Global Supply Chain,” 2005, p. 7.

6. James Giermanski, “No More Excuses or Delays,” American Shipper, October 2006, pp. 2-4.